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Across discussions of a broadly postmodern nature, one commonly 
finds appeal to a rather w1common notion: the notion of otherness. 
The commonness of the appeal tends to belie the fact that the 
notion being appealed to is so loosely defined that it is often 
unclear precisely how it is being used. This paper is motivated by 
the concern that this concept of the Other is so broad, malleable, 
and ill-defined that the radical potential of its use lies in danger 
of being dissipated. I wish to defend the analytic potential of this 
primary term of contemporary debate, concentrating upon two 
fields where in the notion of otherness has performed a primary 
role: those of theology and feminism. 
The notion of otherness is unlike other philosophical concepts 
- or, more precisely, unlike other concepts that are subject of 
philosophical analysis - in that it denotes tha t which philo-
sophy does not and in fact cannot interpolate. The history of 
philosophy may be read - as is common of late- as an attempt at 
a universal synthesis; it is an attempt to interpret the world as a 
whole, as a totality. Within the bounds of the reasonable, 
consciousness grasps and embraces the world, leaving nothing 
beyond its conceptual hold, beyond the limits of knowledge. The 
realm of consciousness is, however, ultimately finite. As such, it 
cannot draw the infinite within its bounds. This notion of 
otherness, then, is the concept that has been used to refer to that 
beyond the bounds of conceptual determination - beyond reason, 
beyond knowledge, beyond language. 
Now this aim of philosophy - to grasp the world in its 
totality - has, of course, been subject to the most rigorous scrutiny 
throughout its history. And so philosophy has constantly been 
required to justify itself - specifically, to justify its claim to 
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totality. In this respect, the suggestion recently popularised by 
philosophers such as Rorty that philosophy faces a sort of 
watershed - a crisis arising from its inability to meet this 
demand for justification - are simply ahistorical. Philosophy 
stands in no different situation than it has ever stood in regard to 
its difficulties of self-legitimation. 
These philosophers of crisis fail to note that, throughout its 
history, philosophy has been subject to systematic interrogation 
and upon grounds akin to those proposed of late. The major thrust of 
this interrogation has in fact derived from a theological concern. 
From its very origins, theology has evidenced a commitment to the 
notion of otherness, in its claims as to the otherness of God. In the 
writings of the Church Fathers Gregory of Nyssa and Oionysius 
the Areopagite, God is understood as an entity beyond our ability 
to conceptualise; His nature is wholly Other to the finite realm 
that philosophical speculation is capable of grasping (cf, for 
example: Pseudo-Oionysius, 1980, Ch. 1). Indeed, throughout its 
history, theology has challeng(!d philosophy for its inability to 
conceive the Other, to recognise the force of the Other in 
ci rcumscribing its pretensions to totality. It is this that lies at the 
root of the antagonism between theology and philosophy, an 
antagonism that has developed in accordance with the growth in 
philosophy's pretensions. 
Within the 20th century, however, the concern with the 
status of the Other has evolved in new and equally challenging 
ways. The most prominent and self-conscious development in the 
evolution of this concept derives from the field of feminism. 
Simone de Beauvoir, drawing upon the Hegelian treatment of the 
master/slave dialectic, pivots her analysis around precisely this 
concept in asking why it is that woman stands as other to man and 
other to culture more generally. Woman, she says, 'has been 
defined as the Other', with 'no past, no history, no religion' of her 
own, unable to establish the terms of her own existence withi:n 
culture except by reference to man (de Beauvoir, 1949, pp. 19-29). 
Throughout history, woman has stood in a relation of immanence to 
the field of transcendence dominated by man. 
This analysis of woman's otherness has served as an 
extraordinarily rich vein within feminist thought. A great number 
of feminist philosophers, drawing in particular upon the 
psychoanalytic insights of Lacan, have contributed to a general 
account of the otherness of woman in respect of the symbolic 
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systems of this culture, those systems that govern the construction 
of meaning and value within society. This account reaches its 
greatest sophistication in the writings of the French feminists, 
Julia Kristeva, Helene Cixious and Luce Irigaray. It is to the latter 
of these philosophers that I shall appeal in what follows. 
There is one further treatment of otherness that is 
fundamental to a contemporary understanding of this notion. The 
most broad and far-ranging discussion of the import of the Other 
has emerged from within philosophy itself: this is the 
phenomenological account of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas is 
responsible for extending the notion of otherness to incorporate all 
relations to the I. That is to say, he conceives of all others as 
filling the role of otherness in relation to the I. For Levinas, the 
non-I acts as an other insofar as it challenges the integrity of the I, 
demanding that the I incorporate a concern for the non-I in every 
human relation: 'responsibility for the Other ... is what is 
incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse' 
(Levinas, 1985, p. 101). The notion of otherness is thus accorded a 
primacy within philosophy; philosophy is incapable of framing 
its metaphysical and epistemological questions without a prior 
regard for what is the fundamental ethical question of the status 
of the Other. 
Now there is, I consider, a serious question that arises from 
the contemporary treatment of otherness, which might be framed 
as follows: in broadening our notion of the Other to the extent that 
it pertains to every and any non-I, do we deprive this notion of its 
specificity, its singularity? The notion of the other, it seems, is 
simply too broad to sustain its role in challenging the limits of 
philosophical conceptualisation. If any other now stands as a 
ground for philosophical questioning, then surely our notion of the 
other has proliferated to an extent that its meaning has become 
dissolute. 
The question might also be framed in terms of the 
secularisation that this notion has undergone: has the Other been 
placed so firmly within the immanent domain that we have lost 
the original force of the appeal to that beyond conceptualisation, 
to the transcendental beyond? For the Other in question is no longer 
the wholly Other of theological speculation; it is an Other that 
resides firmly within the realm of finite and material human 
relations. The Other, in other words, is no longer absolute; it is an 
other that is merely relative to the I, to the One. Surely the 
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theological challenge to philosophy is thereby reduced, 
dissipated, banalised? 
I suspect that this critique of the contemporary notion of 
otherness can indeed be sustained in relation to a good deal of 
postmodern discussions of otherness. There is, as 1 have mentioned, 
a tendency to assume that all notions of the Other can be reduced to 
one another and that the broad, secular notion of otherness suffices 
to capture the spil"it of the challenge to philosophy. I would 
however want to bracket the writings of Jrigaray and Levinas-
and certain others, including Derrida - from this charge. For 
there is a great deal in their writings to suggest that the initial 
spirit of the challenge that the notion of the Other provides is not 
lost to them. This is reflected in their recognition of the divine 
element in the structure of the relations governing otherness. What 
distinguishes the writings of Irigaray and Levinas in particular is 
the role that they ascribe to God in the mediation of the relations 
of otherness within the immanent plane. 
Far from being party to the secularisation of otherness, these 
analyses provide a critique of this tendency, in their critique of the 
way in which the notion of otherness has been used to reflect and 
affirm the qualities of the One and the Same. Upon these 
analyses, the secularisation of otherness can be read as a process 
whereby the qualities of the wholly Other, the qualities of God, 
have been coopted by Man. Insofar as Man has been taken to 
instantiate a higher form of being - a being that is purportedly 
autonomous, independent and ideally unconditioned, a being to 
whom a higher form of love is proper - this theological notion of 
otherness has been adopted as a front for the affirmation of the 
value of the One, the Same. The secularisation of otherness is thus 
a process of the divinisatlon of Man; it is the story of Man become 
absolute. But, as Nietzsche himself recognised, this self-image of 
man as the One is implicated in the death of God, to the extent 
that Man too sits on the brink of the abyss, on the verge of crisis. 
It is at the conjunction of the feminist and theological concerns 
over the seculaiisation of otherness that I wish to situate the 
questions that motivate the rest of this paper: what may feminist 
and theological readings of otherness contribute to one another? 
How might this conjunction help to alleviate the nihilism that 
pervades the death of God and Man? The first point that must be 
made in this context is that these two discourses of otherness hark 
from fundamentally different arenas and address fundamentally 
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differing concerns. This gives rise to notions of otherness that are, 
in substantive terms, not merely different but in some specific 
respects, at odds, competing. Let me offer two prominent examples 
of the disparity between them. 
The first has to do with the issue of the relation of 
transcendence and immanence. The otherness of the theologian-
if I may call it that - is principally an otherness of the transcen-
dental, of the absolute beyond. What makes God the ultimate site 
of Otherness for the negative theologian in particular is that He is 
wholly other; he shares none of the features of finite being. He is 
infinite, eternal, uncreated, unconditioned and so on. 
Upon the common feminist reading, the affirmation of a God 
who is radically transcendent in this sense will merely serve to 
reinforce the denigration of those qualities of the immanent that 
are symbolically associated with femininity. This debate 
commonly focuses upon the status of corporeality, since this is 
principle among the qualities of finite being. From a feminist 
perspective, it is the symbolic association of corporeality with 
femininity that has underscored the divinisation of Man, who 
transcends the immanent plane of corporeality. Irigaray's notion of 
the sensible transcendent, by contrast, is a notion of a God that is 
immanent to the existence of woman as a corporeal being. She 
speaks of 'an immanent efflorescence of the divine', that mediates 
all stages of our becoming within culture and its discourses 
(Irigaray, 1993, p. 30). This is not a God of absolute transcendence 
nor yet a God who is secularised; rather, it is a God who is 
realised, who becomes immanent in the body of woman. 
Despite the appeal to immanence, there remains in Irigaray's 
writings, like those of other feminist theologians, the 
fundamental feminist concern for the possibilities of transcendence. 
Irigaray wishes to specify the conditions that must hold if woman 
is to attain a transcendence beyond the mundane, a transcendence of 
which she is capable and yet denied for lack of a divine model. 
And so she posits a God that can act as the grounds of women's 
possibilities, a mirror for the highest possible forms of her 
becoming. Her God is transcendent, not in the sense of being far 
away and beyond, but rather in the sense of being ultimate, the 
highest and most sacred. 
A second point of difference between feminist and theological 
accounts of otherness thereby emerges, and once again I take 
Irigaray as exemplary on this point: the God that Irigaray evokes 
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is not a God of Oneness or singularity; it is a God that grounds 
plurality and multiplicity. God is in this sense a multifarious God, 
a God whom women can share even while affirming their 
differences. It is in fact the oneness of God that makes the 
masculine singularly privileged when this notion of the other is 
secularised. In refusing the oneness of God, Irigaray can be read as 
articulating a more ultimate otherness, an otherness understood as 
the ultimate expression of difference. 
The differences between the feminist and theological accounts 
of otherness allow the impression that these are truly divergent 
disciplines. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that, in structural 
terms, there remain important relations between these two 
accounts. It is from this convergence that the highly fertile field of 
feminist theology issues. Let me outline very briefly some of these 
correlations between the two accounts of the Other. 
First, contemporary theological and feminist accounts of 
otherness commonly converge in the understanding of the 
relational nature of being, in their denial of the ability of Man to 
act in the world as a purely autonomous and self-propelled being. 
Granted these relations are conceived in differing ways: the 
theological analysis appealing to structures governing human 
relations to transcendence and the feminist analysis appealing to 
structures governing intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, in each, it is 
the relational character of existence that underscores and gives 
meaning to the subject's experience. 
The point can be made even more strongly: upon both these 
accounts, individual subjectivity would not be possible were it not 
for the existence of the Other. The subject is, in a structural sense, 
dependent upon an Other. From a theological perspective, for 
example, sociality and love are only possible if there is a loving 
God who mediates the relations of the One and an Other. From a 
feminist perspective, man cannot ultimately elide the contribution 
of woman in weaving the fabrk of human relations. So, not only is 
the Other other, but it is the very grounds of the possibility of 
otherness; it is what allows the relation between the One and the 
Other. 
For both these disciplines, the Other remains in a certain 
sense beyond comprehensibility, beyond the systematisation of 
thought. The Other cannot be dominated or mastered; it remains 
ultimate, in the sense of being always beyond the subject's grasp. It 
escapes the logic of the One and the Same and cannot be 
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represented within its discourses. It can only be represented 
analogically and this of course is the space from within which 
negative or apophatic theologies issue. It is also, by a different but 
related logic, the space wherein the possibility of an ecriture 
feminine- a writing (of) woman- resides. 
Pursuing this theme, not only does God act as the ground of 
otherness, but by the same token His presence disrupts the 'proper' 
of language, inserting discourses that cannot be assessed by 
reference to a standard syntax - those of the mystics, for example. 
So too with woman. Perhaps the principle theme of French 
feminism is that woman's experiences cannot be explained within 
the monological terms of exchange of language. This theme points 
to a certain absence within language and within the propositional 
knowledge that it prioritises. The articulation of a notion of 
otherness suggests that, in the final account, the finite being that 
we are cannot complete the task of knowledge, without eradicating 
otherness by reducing it to the Same. In this sense, the notion of the 
Other thus marks a point of rupture within the discourses of Man. 
And yet, by this same logic, the One is drawn to the Other by 
a desire that cannot ultimately be disavowed. Levinas is right, I 
think, to affirm that a relation of the I to the non-1 that is not 
characterisable as a knowledge or a contemplation, but rather as 
the expression of desire (Levinas, 1985, p. 92). God is realised in 
the desire for that which is excessive, a desire for an ultimate 
beyond. Feminists too have analysed this economy of desire 
governing the relations of man to woman and the ambivalences it 
creates. It is desire that places the relations of Man to God, and of 
man to woman, on an intimate plane. There is a room for a wealth 
of psychoanalytical insight here. 
The relation to otherness can thus be characterised as the 
experience of an excessive immediacy of the One to the Other, an 
immediacy that haunts and disturbs the One, and must be pursued 
for precisely this reason. It is the experience of a radical alterity, 
a heterogeneity that is nevertheless present. Ultimately, what 
this notion of otherness signifies is a certain ambivalence, common 
to feminist and theological discourses, towards the absolute nature 
of transcendence. Although the theological notion of otherness has 
been employed to reinforce God's absolute status, the recent 
analyses of negative theology of Derrida, among others, show that 
this God is nevertheless a presence - a hyperessentiality, as 
Derrida describes it (Derrida, 1992, p . 74 ). What is ultimately 
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affirmed by these apophatic discourses is the possibility of a union 
with the Divine that occurs within time, within the here and now 
of experience. 
This leads me to my last point: both theological and feminist 
discussions of otherness focus upon the ability of experience to 
relate the one to the other. The infinite natLtre of the Other may 
not be assimilated within thought, but it is not for that reason 
inaccessible to the senses. And so for example the approach to God 
has a strong existential dimension; it is given expression in a 
particular form of life. The theme here, in common with feminist 
approaches, is that this relation to the Other cannot evade the 
personal, social and ethical dimensions of one's life. 
Convergences such as these have lead Levinas to suggest that 
the notion of otherness itself has a feminine nature: the 'feminine 
is other for a masculine being not only because of a different nature 
but also inasmuch as alterity is in some way its nature' (Levinas, 
1985, p. 65). Levinas locates in the feminine the locus and origin of 
the very concept of alterity and this prompts him to consider the 
relation to woman as a primary model of the relations to otherness. 
It is a point that was glimpsed by Nietzsche: that one can use the 
feminine to signify the Other in its most general terms. In 
Nietzsche, the feminine acts as the very possibility of the appeal 
to the Other within discourse. 
These convergences also suggest that jt is too simplistic to 
assume- as some feminist theologians tend to do- that God acts 
as a monolithic category designed primarily to reinforce a 
masculine symbolic (cf, for example: Ouist, 1987). Certainly, the 
attributions of Lord, King and Father to the Godhead have been 
used to this effect. But the more fertile attributes that accrue to 
God also allow for the recognition of a feminine face of divinity. In 
respect of God's status as Other, He shares with woman the 
qualities of heterogeneity, incommensurability, indefinability and 
infinitude; these are the features of otherness that are evocative 
across theological and feminist thought. And so, contrary to some 
feminist theological discussion, I suggest that there is much that 
can be exploited by feminism in the analysis of God's otherness and 
its feminine metaphorics. 
This theological and feminist understanding of otherness is 
productive in that it expresses a dynamism, a movement toward 
that which is other, a movement beyond that which is equal to us. 
This notion of the Other is bound up with the notion of an other 
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vision, an alternate understanding of the relation of the immanent 
to the transcendent that is not bound by anticipatable limits and 
boundaries. Otherness is here seen as an opening, a point of access 
to that which exceeds the limits of conceptual determination. It is 
the irruption of difference within language. 
This analysis of the relations of contemporary theology and 
feminism perhaps gives rise to more questions than it answers. To 
finish, I will submit two questions of central importance. First, 
what is the Other for the Other that is woman? Lacan, of course, 
claims that there is none, there is no other of the Other (Lacan, 
1977, p. 311). The question remains, however: if man cannot 
assimilate the Other within discourse, what of woman, who is 
already other to this discourse? The second question follows: if 
femininity is in some way exemplary of the Other, what of 
woman's relations to this Other? Are they also to be framed by 
reference to this exemplary model of the relation to woman? In 
which case, is it the relation of woman to herself that is 
idealised? Or is it the relation of woman to an other woman that is 
exemplary, complete with the erotic overtones that Levinas 
recognises in all relations to the Other? These are questions such as 
de Beauvoir asked, and they remain central to feminism. One way 
to pursue them, I suggest, is by way of a return to the originary 
concept of otherness, that evidenced by the Divine. 
School of Philosophy, University of Sydney. 
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